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VIEWPOINT
Rational Planners and irrational Politicians:
The Ideology
ol Development Administration
by Edwin A. Brett*
Economists are the soothsayers of contemporary
society. They read computer printout as their forebears
read the entrails of the sacrificial goat. The process
is more hygenic but no more accurate.(1) Plans fail
to reach their targets or do so by accident. Long-
term trends suddenly change course for totally unexpected
reasons. But the oracles are not closed down. Societies
need their soothsayers especially when they are unsure
of the future - failure simply induces more investment
to reduce the deficiencies thus exposed. If the old
goats do not serve, then breed new strains whose anatomy
corresponds more nearly to the empirical reality whose
changes are to be anticipated. Theories, models, and
techniques proliferate. Some even convince themselves
that they have arrived at the promised land. Recently,
a well-known development planner claimed to have success-
fully planned the economies of no less than sixteen
countries over a three year period, Haiti, no less,
among them. Truly there are no limits to the powers
of modern science.
The science of planning and the science of goats
have two characteristics in common - they are concerned
to read the future and their connections with the real
world exist only in the minds of believers. And this
inability to connect is not simply the outcome of technical
* E. A. brett is a lecturer in Politics at the
University of Sussex.
U) Sidney Schoeffler (The FcJiwte o EeonornJc,l955)
is one of the few economists willing to set out the
evidence and consider seriously the theoretical failures
which produce this effect.
imperfections which more sophistication will remedy
but derives from a profound musunderstanding of the
nature of politics and of its relationship to processes
of social and economic change. To substantiate this
assertion let us consider the planners' creed, which
has four primary and two contingent articles.(1)
Planning is rational. Value-free social scientific
techniques can be used to discover least-cost solutions
to problems posed by the attempt to achieve economic
goals.
Planning is economic. The economic can be
separated from the political and social spheres both
analytically and in practice. In this way, scientific
economic analysis can be applied to economic facts,
and economic tools at the disposal of the state can
then be used to influence these facts in the desired
direction.
Contingent on the above, plan evaluation is
in relation to the "measuring rod of money" and expressed
in terms of growth in national product.
Politics is rational or irrational. Rational
politics is when the government identifies the general
interests of the nation and gives these to the planners
as their starting point. It thereafter accepts the
planners' allocations of the resources required to advance
these interests and uses its power to get people to
collaborate "towards a common end which will be to the
profit of all."(2) Irraflotial politics (the more common
variety) is where special interests use their power
to oppose the plan for purely selfish reasons and thus
create 'political obstacles to development.'(3)
11) In case hostile critics feel I am simply erecting
a straw man I would refer them to Ilchman1s survey of
actual planistrator's attitudes in R. Braibanti, ed.,
PoLLtLcaJ and AdnuivLt&atLve Vv2opn, p. 472 f f.
F. Oules, Econorn-L PanLng o.nd Vemoctac.y,
p. 242.
Political Scientists are useful for studying and
finding ways of overcoming these. In much the same
category are "social obstacles to development". These
can be studies by sociologists in developed countries
and social anthrolplogists in underdeveloped countries.
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Planning is national and can be effective.
Control over the key economic levers is lodged in central
governmental institutions of the nation state. Governments
can utilise these levers independently of the constraints
imposed by the special interests of international and
internal economic groups.
Contingent upon four and five, planning can
only be implemented by an efficient and uncorrupt cardre
of administrators. The highest form of administrator
is the trained economic planner (hereinafter 'planistrator',
to borrow Raymond Apthorpe's useful term) who know best
and should be obeyed.
Let us now consider the implications of these propositions
paying particular attention to their tendency to systemati-
cally misstate reality and hence misuse and mystify their
adherents.
Article I raises at least two fundamental problems.
First, not all planners are aware of the critical distinction
between what Weber calls formal as' opposed to substantive
rationality. The first is simply concerned to find
least cost routes to particular ends, the second with
the "absolute values or the content of (those) ends."(1)
Planistrators' rationality is by definition formal rationality
only. Planistrators must take the goals given to them
by politicians as their work would cease to be value
free and therefore politically neutral. This would
have adverse implications for career prospects in politically
unstable situations. But formally rational techniques
can be used to achieve substantively irrational purposes.
It is of small compensation to people exposed to such
policies to be informed that they have been worked out
in accordance with the most up to date scientific principles.
Thus we (and also those actually subjected to planistrators'
rationality) are justified in questioning planistrators'
decisions not only with regard to their tendency to
attain their own goals (this tendency is called 'efficiency'),
but also whether the goals themselves are substantively
rational or not (this used to be discussed by old fashioned
people concerned with outmoded concepts like 'justice'
or even 'freedom').
(1) Ike. Yke.oity o SocLa2. and EcovwmLc. OanLwUon,
1964, p.185.
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Secondly, if formal rationality is to operate
successfully within the intellectual limits which it
does accept, it must meet certain theoretical requirements.
The use of rational technique requires working models
which approximate in their main features the critical
elements in the situations to be brought under control.
To "work", the model must correspond to reality in the
sense that a scientist who believes diseases are caused
by germs will better understand the causation of diseases
than one who believes they are caused by evil spirits.
Thus to judge the adequacy of planistrators' rationality
it is necessary to consider whether their model of reality
(i.e. that set out in articles 2 to 6 above) does in
fact correspond with reality and provides an adequate
basis for diagnosis and prescription. Thus my argument
does not depend upon an anti-scientific and intuitive
approach to social reality. It depends upon an ability
to show that planners' models do not in their main features
correspond to the reality they are trying to control.
I have argued at length elsewhere(1) and it is
now in any case generally accepted (in theory at least)
that economic questions cannot be meaningfully examined
outside the political and social context in which they
arise. It is impossible to review all of these arguments
here, but it is necessary to point out that even those
who do accept this basic proposition often do so in
a manner which takes them very little further forward.
For what has tended to happen is for planistrators to
recognise that they depend upon the government both
to provide them with objectives and to carry out their
plans. Thus their freedom of action is directly constrained
by those political facts which they must understand
and accept before they can get to work and produce politically
acceptable prescriptions.
All planners profess a very sophisticated understanding
of the 'politics' of the country they are advising derived
from their experience of dealing with politicians and
especially from the skills which they are forced to
acquire in mediating between, and defending themselves
within, the contending factions in any political arena.
The analysis of politics is therefore seen as an essentially
pragmatic exercise - finding out who is in, who is out,
who can be relied on to support particular policies
(1) "Politics, Economics and Rationality," Soc)Lc2
Scíenc.e Ino'unwtiLon, 8 (2), April, 1969.
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and who will oppose them. This kind of pragmatic political
knowledge (which does not, of course, have the same
intellectual status as 'scientific' economic theory)
can then be used to overcome the problems of getting
plans accepted and implemented. According to Alvin
Hayne:
While the planner may feel that the current method
of decision-making is not adequate, he must recognise
that there is already a decision-making apparatus
in being. Part of the task of the practical planner
is to develop the strategic and tactical measures
whereby the decision-making techniques called for
by the development plan can gradually replace existing
decision-making operation. (1)
Leaving aside the rather delicate questions of how a
'value-free' economic scientist recognises an 'adequate'
decision-making process, it is simply worth noting that
strongly elitist bias of this sort of thinking and,
indeed, of those assumptions that substitute planistrators'
rationality for demands from below as the basis from
which economic policy should be evolved.
Returning to our goat analogy, perhaps the most
significant entrail to be examined is the growth of
Gross National Product. The fundamental point concerning
this indicator (conventionally measured) is that it
conceals far more than it reveals. In the first place,
as Peter Wiles' brilliant chapter on this matter shows,
"nearly all output and cost of living indices are wrong," f2)
and especially wrong in concealing changes in relative
improvement or regression as between both rich and poor
classes and rich and poor countries. Secondly, as is
now becoming increasingly evident with the emergence
of the pollution debate, growth figures take virtually
no account of what economists politely call negative
externalities. Expansion in car output features very
prominently in American GNP figures; the fact that
exhaust fumes are destroying the ecology over a radius
of almost 100 miles around Los Angeles does not. To
my knowledge, nobody has tried to work out any effective
G.M. Meier, (ed.), Lw4-&tg I&su.eo -Lri. VeveLopment
Ec.onom-Lc.4, p. 496-7; also Ilchamn, op.cLt., esp. p.518-
521.
P.J.D. Wiles, Tite. PoV .LaoJ Economy o Commwvi,
p.247.
index of the distribution of the costs and benefits
of growth across communities and nations.*
This leads into the planistrators' assumptions
about the proper purposes of politics which derive
directly from their need to define politics in essentially
organic or mechanistic terms. According to Oules:
There are only two possible economic policies; on
the one hand the policy of those who know how to
adapt economic mechanisms to the interdependent factors,
the current requirements of the economy and the con-
tingencies of their time: on the other hand the
policy of those who take no account of (them).(1)
This kind of "economic and technological determinism"(2)
implies not only that there is one really 'rational'
solution to the problems of economic growth and that
therefore very little real freedom of action is really
open to any government whose "area of decision is,
in fact, exceedingly small."(3) Thus even those who
do look at the problem of political development theoretically
see the problem as essentially one of developing a
system of overarching control which will make it possible
for essentially general societal interests in development
to be identified and operationalised through the machinery
of administration both public and private. Thus Braibanti,
in his evaluation of America's strategy for inducing
the right kinds of political development in client
states, sees the "first attribute of political development"
as "the requirement of common agreement on a fundamental
policy of the state - an overarching purpose which
gives form, cohesion, and direction to all public action
within a sensed community."(4) Planistrators must
necessarily assume that the government for which they
work does, in fact, express such an overarching agreement,
and the policies which they build into the plan necessarily
give concrete expression to the attempt to achieve
an ever more productive and equitable version of such
* Editorial note: vLd M. Lipton, A4e.44Lng EwnorivLc
Ponnctnc.e, London, 1968.
Oules, Op.CLt., p. 11. (my emphasis).
Ilchman, Op.CLt., p.499, referring to the attitudes
of the planistrators in his sample.
J. K. Gaibraith, The. New Indut'ria2 Sta-te., p.397.
Braibanti, "External inducement of political-
administrative development: an institutional strategy,"
Op.CLt., p.37.
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society. Failure to do so would be to see their work
identified as the tool of special interests and therefore
devalued as a scientific enterprise. The application
of scientific technique thus serves to raise the status
of the plan above that of mere 'political' policy; it
acquires a special form of legitimacy reserved in more
innocent days to doctrines sanctified by the writ of
God. Everyone can thus be asked to express their concern
for the plan the form of hard work and willingness
to make the maximum sacrifice for the national good."(l)
Conversly those groups and social attitudes which do
not accept the planistrators' consensus as binding them
to "maximum sacrifice" can be classified as anti-rational
in their orientations and dismissed as "harmful to develop-
ment."(2) Where such groups can organise and make their
wishes felt they are then classified as 'obstacles to
development' who need to be educated, manipulated or,
in the last resort, forced to accept the changes necessary
for the plan to go through. (3)
Planistrators, therefore, must identify with the
ruling elite. If they do not like this elite, the most
they can hope to do is to manipulate "decision-making
techniques" from within, for they cannot think of alternatiye
planning orientation directed towards the transformation
of society in the interests of classes not included
in the existing establishment coalition. They must
also assume that this elite does, in fact, have autonomous
control over the key economic levers, that the groups
who control the internal economy are amenable to the
incentives or sanctions which the government is willing
to bring to bear on them, that the government will be
willing to take measures against specific vested interests
whose interests stand in the way of planned change,
and that national government in essentially client states
will be able to act independently of the interests of
dominant foreign firms and countries whenever they need
to do so. There is now a great mass of evidence which
suggests that these assumptions are very rarely true.
They can, in fact, only be believed by those who assume
an artificial separation of political from economic
life and do not see political power as, in part an expression,
in part a realisation of economic power. When particular
A. Milton Obote, "Preface", to (Jo/izo't PJwgMss,
UgaLndct'4 Seco,td Fíue-Vecvt mean, p.ii.
Ilchamn, Op.CLt., p. 496, 492.
Th-Ld., p.500.
plans are analysed it quickly becomes clear that they
embody strategies which involve the promotion of some
interests in preference to others - for example, the
great bulk of the developmental resources involved in
the second Uganda plan are likely to have directly benefitted
less than 5Z of the population. Again, almost invariably,
structural economic change involves a net loss of income,
security and/or status to numerous groups whose former
skills are made functionally redundant by new ones.
To assume that it is 'irrational' for them to oppose
such changes is to assume that their interests have
an objectively lower value than those of groups which
benefit from it. To argue that this judgement is derived
from a special kind of 'scientific' knowledge is merely
to attempt to evade the problem of justifying policies
in terms of those old fashioned concepts like justice,
freedom and equality.
Thus it can be seen that the search for an essentially
'neutral' bureaucracy is about as profitable a quest
as the one for a neutral social scientist. Planners
do, indeed, need bureaucrats who will do what they tell
them, but to assume that honest bureaucracy necessarily
promotes the public good derives from the prior assumption
that the proper execution of government plans and policies
necessarily does so too. Since planistrators make plans
they are not overly disposed to question this assumption;
but those who are affected by plans may be. Scott notes
that "peasants who avoid their land taxes by making
smaller and illegal contributions to the disposable
income of the Revenue Officer are as surely influencing
the outcome of government policy as if they formed a
peasant union and agitated for the reduction of land
taxes."Cl) In fact they are far more surely influencing
such policy; in most underdeveloped states they would
probably have been refused permission to form such a
union on the ground that it would have constituted an
obstacle to development. Thus the planistrators' view
of the world ultimately succeeds in elevating the neutral
economist/bureaucrat to the position of philosopher
king; they are the people who can see across all the
narrow concerns of sectional interests to the national
interests which they alone have the ability to comprehend
and operationalíse.
(1) "Corruption, machine politics and political change",
AmeLcwi PoUtLcci Saíue Reu-Leu, LXIII, 4, Dec. 1969,
p.1142.
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There is, of course, nothing very new in this.
Perhaps the first planistrators blueprint can be found
in Plato's RepabtLa. The principles have not changed
over two thousand years: the growth of modern science
and modern technology have merely invested them with
much more pervasive aura of rationality. But this ration-
ality, like much else implicit in the dominant ideology
of planistration, is spurious; it attributes special
powers to those who control society and devalues
the potential contribution of those groups whose interests
are not symmetrical with the wishes of the ruling elite.
Expressed in this way, the work done by planistrators
is immediately open to an immense range of critical
questions, and so are the functions which planning
performs in the validation and perpetuation of
partucular economic systems. These are characterised
by massively unequal patterns of change and high
degrees of overt and covert repression in their
treatment of disadvantaged groups, which often constitute
the majority of the population.
All this is not to say that there should be no
science, no planning, and that all politics are bad.
It is to argue that planners must be seen to be instruments
of political forces, and that the goodness or badness
of what they do must be judged in relation to those
forces. There is nothing inevitable or special about
the decisions to which they arrive. A real change
in political power must lead to new plans which will
attempt to attain objectives which former planners found
impossible because to do so would involve the elimination
of classes whose interests had previously been sacred.
Only thus could the Chinese move from a landlord
dominated to a cooperative dominated agricultural
system. This could not have been carried out by
planistrators from above; it required the organisation
of a massive political movement from below which forced
the government to redefine its objectives and made it
possible to create the new institutions required for
the new forms of production.(1) Planners who take
neutral economic theory as their starting point
and the institution of a neutral bureaucracy as
their agency are either bound to reinforce tendencies
implicit in the existing political-economic power
structure or end up disappointed and cynical men.
(1) W. Hinton, Fcut6ken; F. Schuurman, Ideo.P.ogy and
OgariJatLon -Ln ConirnanL-t ChAina.
